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ABSTRACT: The fundamental issue regarding Arcesilaus’ skepticism is whether it should be 
understood as a philosophical position or as a strictly dialectical practice with no doctrinal content. In 
this paper I argue that it is both by providing an account of the epistemic principles informing his 
practice along with a positive doxastic attitude that he may consistently take towards those principles. 
I further show how Arcesilaus may have reasonably derived his Socratic project, including the 
epistemic principles and his distinctive cognitive attitude, from his reading of Plato’s dialogues, and 
that this approach enables us to better understand the function of his practical criterion, the 
reasonable (to eulogon). And finally, I note that since Arcesilaus’ great successor Carneades confronts 
the same problem regarding the coherence of his Socratic project, a similar interpretative approach 
may be taken to his practical criterion, the persuasive (to pithanon). 
SOMMARIO: La questione fondamentale concernente lo scetticismo di Arcesilao è se esso debba essere 
inteso come una posizione filosofica o come una pratica strettamente dialettica senza alcun 
contenuto dottrinale. In questo articolo sostengo che lo scetticismo di Arcesilao è ambedue queste 
cose, fornendo un resoconto dei principi epistemici che fondano la sua posizione insieme a un 
atteggiamento doxastico positivo che egli assume costantemente in relazione a tali principi. Mostrerò, 
inoltre, come sia plausibile che Arcesilao possa aver derivato il suo progetto socratico, compresi i 
principi epistemici e il suo peculiare atteggiamento cognitivo, dalla lettura dei dialoghi di Platone, e 
come tale contatto con gli scritti platonici permetta di comprendere meglio la funzione del suo 
criterio pratico, il ragionevole (to eulogon). Infine, poiché Carneade, l’importante successore di 
Arcesilao, affronta lo stesso problema per ciò che riguarda la coerenza del suo progetto socratico, 
mostrerò come un simile approccio interpretativo possa essere adottato anche in relazione al suo 
criterio pratico, il persuasivo (to pithanon). 
                                                                          
* My thanks to Tim O’Keefe for providing extensive comments on an earlier draft of 
this essay that enabled me to clarify some key points.  
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Arcesilaus initiated a skeptical phase in Plato’s Academy sometime after taking 
over as head around 267 BCE. Like Socrates, he committed none of his 
thoughts to the page, so we must rely on the reports of others, often at quite a 
remove, to piece together his position or practice.1 In fact, the fundamental 
issue regarding Arcesilaus’ skepticism is whether it should be understood as a 
philosophical position in the first place, or whether it is better understood as a 
strictly dialectical practice, with no doctrinal content.2  
The problem derives from certain propositions, which Cicero attributes 
to him in such a way as to suggest the following argument: 
(i) it is rash and shameful to assent to something false or unknown, but since  
(ii) nothing can be known (and obviously we shouldn’t do what is rash and shameful),  
(iii) we should suspend judgment about everything (Varro, 44-45).  
If Arcesilaus believes (i.e. assents to) (i) and (ii), he must also believe that he 
knows neither (i) nor (ii), since he believes nothing can be known. And if he 
knows neither (i) nor (ii) then by (i) he must admit that it is rash and shameful 
to believe either. Even if he somehow manages to overcome these difficulties, 
and believes (iii) on the basis of (i) and (ii), he must then admit that he should 
not believe (iii), or for that matter (i) and (ii), since he believes we should 
suspend judgment about everything. So there is quite a mess to clean up if 
Arcesilaus were to assent to these propositions as part of his own positive 
philosophical position. On the other hand, if he does not assent to these 
propositions we must explain why they are so closely associated with him, and 
what role they play in his skeptical practice.  
                                                                          
1 Fragments and testimonia for Arcesilaus are collected in H. J. Mette, “Zwei 
Akademiker heute: Krantor von Soloi und Arkesilaos von Pitane”, Lustrum, 26, 1984, p. 41-
94. And now see S. Vezzoli, Arcesilao di Pitane: L’origine del Platonismo neoaccademico, 
Turnhout, Brepols, 2016. 
2 For concise and informative introductions to the interpretative issues and options, 
see C. Brittain, “Arcesilaus”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
2008 (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arcesilaus/ [11.11.2018]) and 
A. M. Ioppolo, “Arcesilaus”, in D. Machuca-B. Reed (eds.), Skepticism from Antiquity to the 
Present, London, Bloomsbury, 2018, p. 36-50. For a more general overview of scholarship on 
the Skeptical Academy, see D. Machuca, “Ancient Skepticism: The Skeptical Academy”, 
Philosophy Compass, 6 (4), 2011, p. 259-266. 
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Along these lines, Casey Perin has argued that we have so far failed to 
make good sense of Arcesilaus.3 Perin poses the problem as a dilemma: either 
Arcesilaus had philosophical views, as dogmatic interpretations maintain, or 
he did not, as dialectical interpretations maintain.4 The problem for dogmatic 
interpretations is to show how his endorsement of philosophical views is 
consistent with those very views, as I have just sketched.5 And the problem for 
dialectical interpretations is to explain why Arcesilaus bothers to argue against 
other people’s views, and why he refuses to assent to what he does not know. If 
we cannot explain why he behaves this way and what he hopes to achieve, his 
practice is unintelligible. But if we attempt to explain his practice in terms of 
some epistemic principles, we confront the problems facing dogmatic 
interpretations once again. For assenting to these principles without knowing 
them to be true will be rash and shameful, which should lead him to suspend 
judgment. And if he suspends judgment regarding those principles, it is 
unclear how they can explain his practice.6  
                                                                          
3 C. Perin, “Making Sense of Arcesilaus”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 45, 
2013, p. 313-340.  
4 For references to examples of these competing interpretations, see ibid. p. 314 n. 3. 
See also A. M. Ioppolo, Opinione e scienza: Il dibattito tra Stoici e accademici nel III e nel II 
secolo a.C., Naples, Bibliopolis, 1986. Perin singles out the views of Frede and Cooper as 
being difficult to classify since they attempt to read Arcesilaus’ skepticism as both a dialectical 
practice and a view, of some sort: M. Frede, “The Sceptic’s Two Kinds of Assent and the 
Question of the Possibility of Knowledge”, in M. Burnyeat-M. Frede (eds.), The Original 
Sceptics, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1997, p. 127-151, J. Cooper, “Arcesilaus: Socratic and 
Skeptic”, in Id. (ed.), Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 81-103. I agree with Perin’s assessment that 
these attempts fall short. Frede fails to fully clarify what it means for Arcesilaus to merely 
have a view in such a way that does not amount to giving assent. Cooper’s Arcesilaus simply 
finds himself with certain substantive, action-guiding convictions that he is unwilling to 
assert or to defend. Even if we grant that these convictions were not arrived at 
philosophically and thus do not fall within the scope of (iii) when properly qualified, it is 
unclear why he is justified in exempting these convictions from dialectical scrutiny.  
5 Another option, though not much defended today, is that Arcesilaus was a crypto-
dogmatist – i.e. he merely posed as a skeptic in order to determine which students were 
worthy of secretly receiving the wisdom of his positive Platonic views (PH, I, 234), which he 
buried like a “golden treasure” to be discovered by those who could make proper us of them 
(August., Contr. Acad., III, 17, 38). 
6 Similarly, given that Arcesilaus, makes use of reason and argument to call into 
question other applications of reason and argument, we confront the problem that Ioppolo 
sees as common to all forms of skepticism: “whether it is legitimate [or, we may add, even 
possible] for the skeptic to communicate his own non-position to others by drawing upon 
concepts such as reason, opinion, and truth” (Ioppolo, “Arcesilaus”, p. 46).  
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Perin’s insightful challenge highlights a persistent problem regarding 
what we, as well as our ancient sources, mean by ‘belief’ and how we may 
properly differentiate it from other similar or related doxastic attitudes. 
Ordinarily, belief is understood to be a matter of taking something to be true, 
or simply assenting to a proposition. This is clearly the attitude involved in (i) 
as well as (ii) insofar as we suppose that knowledge results from correctly or 
justifiably taking something to be true. But it is curious to note that the 
attitude described in (iii) must be more than merely not assenting, which, 
strictly speaking is all that would follow from (i) and (ii). Arcesilaus’ advocacy 
of suspending judgment (epoche), as we will see, is an expression of his positive 
commitment to open-ended investigation. As such, the attitude of epoche 
implies being invested somehow in the truth of the relevant propositions. It is 
a matter of taking an interested, questioning attitude towards whether, for 
example, virtue is sufficient for happiness, rather than simply not having a 
belief either way.7 So, we will need to appeal to more than (i) and (ii) to explain 
why Arcesilaus is so intent on suspending judgment and leading his 
interlocutors to do the same (Diog. Laert., VP, IV, 28, Cic., Varro, 45), and 
why he continues to investigate even while consistently failing to establish 
anything.  
What we need is a principled explanation for Arcesilaus’ philosophical 
practice. Regardless of whether he ever articulated and defended these 
principles, his practice is the result of intensive reflection on the nature, value, 
and purpose of human life. So unlike the implicit principles expressed through 
patterns of ordinary linguistic and social behavior, it is reasonable to expect 
that the principles expressed through Arcesilaus’ practice will be relatively 
precise and clear. We will also need to explain the attitude Arcesilaus takes 
towards these principles. In order to avoid the problems described above we 
will have to suppose it is something other than belief. This is speculative, given 
the lack of textual evidence, but it seems to be necessary if we are to make sense 
of Arcesilaus’ skepticism.  
Accordingly, in what follows, I present an account of the epistemic 
principles informing Arcesilaus’ practice along with a positive doxastic attitude 
that he may have consistently taken towards those principles (section 3). To 
set the stage, I argue that he may have reasonably adopted this attitude, along 
with the project itself, from his reading of Plato’s dialogues, and as a critical 
response to the direction the Academy had taken (sections 1-2). And I extend 
this approach in an attempt to explain Arcesilaus’ advocacy of his practical 
                                                                          
7 J. Friedman, “Why Suspend Judging”, Nous, 51 (2), 2017, p. 302-326. 
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criterion, the reasonable (to eulogon, section 4). Finally, I briefly note that 
Arcesilaus’ great successor Carneades confronts the same problem regarding 
the coherence of the Socratic project and that he responds by proposing yet 
another practical criterion, the persuasive (to pithanon, section 5).  
1. The Original Academic Position and Plato’s Research Program 
Arcesilaus’ skeptical innovations were seen as both a radical break with his 
predecessors and as a continuation of Platonic philosophy.8 Before instituting 
these innovations, Arcesilaus defended the position that had been maintained 
in the Academy from its founding by Plato, over one hundred years earlier in 
387 BCE (Philod., Acad. Hist., col. XVIII Dorandi). But what could this 
original Academic position have been?  
Given the variety of incompatible metaphysical and ethical views 
attributed to Arcesilaus’ predecessors, it cannot have been a single set of inter-
related propositions supported by a collection of arguments – there is no single 
Platonism in this sense. Even so, it is important to note that these inter-
Academic disagreements took place within a well-defined context, or research 
program. Lloyd Gerson has argued that the central problem bequeathed by 
Plato was to articulate an account of the structure of the intelligible world 
while respecting the constraints of certain non-negotiable principles 
constituting the ‘big tent’ that is Platonism – these principles or starting points 
include the rejection of materialism, relativism, and skepticism.9 This view of 
Plato’s research program allows for a variety of outcomes, especially given the 
extraordinary difficulty of providing a coherent account of the structure of the 
intelligible world and its relation to the material world. Nevertheless, Gerson 
identifies the ultimate aim as the production of a “single, positive construct” 
founded on a metaphysical doctrine.10 The truth of the intelligible world is out 
there, so to speak, and the Platonist’s job is to bring it to light through the 
construction of bold, metaphysical systems. So on this view, even if Arcesilaus’ 
predecessors disagreed about the details they were all working within the 
Platonist tent on the same philosophical project. 
                                                                          
8 J. Dillon, The Heirs of Plato, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 234 ff. 
9 Gerson also includes the rejection of mechanism and nominalism among the basic 
principles, which he describes collectively as Ur-Platonism: L. Gerson, From Plato to 
Platonism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2013, p. 23, 138, 161. 
10 Ibid., p. 305.  
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However, this focus on system-building and the articulation of first 
principles tends to overlook the importance of personal intellectual and moral 
progress, and the elenctic, Socratic aspects of Plato’s philosophy. Even if one of 
Plato’s successors managed to produce an irrefutable metaphysical system, 
there would remain a crucial pedagogical challenge. For such a system could do 
us no good if we are unable to grasp its truth. And if the system turned out to 
be refutable after all we would risk making any further progress by accepting it 
as the truth. Indeed, Plato’s careful distancing of himself from the views he 
explores in his dialogues along with his criticism of writing (Phaedr., 274c-
275b, Ep. VII, 341e) might be seen as a rejection of discursive exposition as a 
productive form of philosophy. Furthermore, Plato seems to have neither 
expected nor enforced any doctrinal orthodoxy in the Academy. Instead he 
engaged his colleagues in a method of inquiry, inspired by Socrates, which 
would lead to the truth in the only way he thought possible, namely by coming 
to grasp it for oneself.11 Similar concerns may have motivated Arcesilaus’ 
teachers, Polemo, Crates and Crantor, who stressed the Socratic aspects of 
Plato’s philosophy in contrast with the system-building of their predecessors, 
Speusippus and Xenocrates, thereby paving the way for what would eventually 
appear to be a skeptical revolution within the Academy (Diog. Laert., VP, IV, 
18).12 
While none of this amounts to a rejection of metaphysical system-
building, it does suggest a slightly different way of thinking about Plato’s 
research program. If we suppose the ultimate goal is to attain virtue and 
happiness in practice, then the construction of metaphysical systems may or 
may not contribute to that end. It is a striking fact that Socrates never 
engages in any metaphysical speculation of his own in Plato’s so-called early, 
aporetic dialogues, all of which end frustratingly in puzzlement. So it may be 
that Plato’s research program grew out of these failures, which he himself so 
                                                                          
11 Dillon, Heirs, p. 16, E. Watts, “Creating the Academy: Historical Discourse and the 
Shape of Community in the Old Academy”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 127, 2007, p. 
109. 
12 A. A. Long, “Diogenes’ Life of Arcesilaus”, Elenchos, 7, 1986, p. 440, Gerson, 
Platonism, p. 161; Snyder argues that Polemo’s objections to Zeno’s ethics and its 
foundation in logic paved the way for Arcesilaus’ skeptical turn, and specifically for the 
continued attack on the Stoic view of wisdom and the kataleptic impression on which it is 
built: C. Snyder, “On the Teaching of Ethics from Polemo to Arcesilaus”, Études 
platoniciennes, 14, 2018 [forthcoming]. See also, Id., “Plato and the Freedom of the New 
Academy”, in H. Tarrant-D. Layne-D. Baltzly-F. Renaud (eds.), Brill’s Companion to the 
Reception of Plato in Antiquity, Leiden, Brill, 2017, p. 58-71. 
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brilliantly depicted. On this view, which I believe to be Arcesilaus’, Plato 
offers his ambitious theories regarding the Forms, the tripartite soul, 
recollection, etc. to explain how it would be possible for human beings to 
achieve the kind of virtue and knowledge that Socrates supposed to be 
necessary if not also sufficient for happiness.  
Indeed, we may also see the later development of Stoic epistemology and 
the account of wisdom it provides as yet another attempt to explain how to 
reasonably satisfy Socrates’ lifelong ambition.13 After all, Zeno was inspired 
by the figure of Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia and he studied in the 
Academy for about twenty years before setting out on his own (Diog. Laert., 
VP, VII, 2-4). So even if he left the Academy, as Gerson might claim, because 
his materialism would not be welcome, he could still be understood to be 
working within Plato’s research program. Dillon goes even further in arguing 
that by the time Arcesilaus began to lead the Academy, Zeno’s Stoicism 
would have been seen as a logical development of positions adopted by the 
Old Academics. And in response, Arcesilaus had to either innovate within 
the Platonic tradition or “follow lamely after Zeno”.14 No doubt Arcesilaus 
was under pressure to establish an institutional identity that would attract 
and retain students; however we should suppose that the prospect of offering 
something different and distinctive in the Academy was not his primary 
motivation but rather a happy consequence of his reading of Plato’s 
dialogues along with other philosophical considerations and experiences.  
2. A more Socratic Project 
To account for Arcesilaus’ continuity within the Academic tradition, we may 
suppose that he continued to engage in Plato’s research program, as I have 
described it. And to account for his break with that tradition, we may suppose 
that he adopted a different cognitive attitude towards the theories being 
proposed and examined. Where his predecessors exercised their Academic 
freedom to arrive at and assent to metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical 
theories that were supposed to provide compelling solutions to the problems 
                                                                          
13 M. Frede, “Stoic Epistemology”, in K. Algra-J. Barnes-J. Mansfeld-M. Schofield 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1999, p. 295-296.  
14 Dillon, Heirs, p. 237. 
Harald Thorsrud 
 202 
raised by Plato’s research program, Arcesilaus exercised his freedom to delay 
such arrivals, and to persist, as Socrates did, in a life of investigation.15  
While this attitude of epoche is enough to differentiate Arcesilaus’ 
philosophical practice from his predecessors’, it is not enough to fully explain 
that practice. For as I noted above, if he were to suspend judgment about 
whether to suspend judgment, it would be unclear as to why he should 
continue to suspend judgment. But if he were to assent to the proposition that 
we should withhold assent his position becomes untenable. So we need to 
identify something other than either withholding or giving assent to capture 
Arcesilaus’ cognitive attitude towards the propositions that characterize his 
practice. This attitude must guide Arcesilaus to suspend judgment when he 
finds the opposing arguments to be equally balanced, but not because he takes 
it to be true that one should suspend judgment. We may think of this as a kind 
of provisional acceptance to serve as a basis for further inquiry or to provide an 
account to be subjected to further scrutiny. And for a model we may look to 
the attitude that Plato’s Socrates takes towards a proposition that characterizes 
his own philosophical project, namely that virtue is a kind of knowledge.16 
                                                                          
15 Arcesilaus’ election to the scholarchy was not controversial among his colleagues 
(Diog. Laert., VP, IV, 32). So it is unlikely that he had been advocating for any dramatic 
changes in Academic practice at first. But after his innovations took root in the Academy, 
the transformation appeared extreme, as we can see in some overtly hostile descriptions: he 
abandoned the doctrines of Plato, establishing an alien, second Academy in its place (Eus., 
PE, XIV, 4, 5); he was first to meddle with the position handed down by Plato, establishing a 
Middle, more eristic, Academy in place of the Old (Diog. Laert., VP, IV, 28, I, 14, cf. Sext. 
Emp., PH, I, 232); he subverted the well-established philosophy of the Old Academy by 
falsely attributing skeptical views to Plato, Socrates, and other illustrious thinkers (Cic., 
Lucull., 14-15); and his contemporary Aristo lampooned him as a philosophical chimera, 
advancing the skepticism of Pyrrho by means of the dialectic of Diodorus, with Plato merely 
as a cover (Diog. Laert., VP, IV, 32-33, Sext. Emp., PH, I, 234, Eus., PE, XIV, 5, 12-14). On 
this satirical comparison, see D. Sedley, “The Protagonists”, in M. Schofield-M. Burnyeat-J. 
Barnes (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1980, p. 11.  
16 For a contemporary model, see L. J. Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. According to Cohen, “Belief carries no conceptual 
implications about reasoning, acceptance carries none about feelings” (p. 5, cf. p. 12-13). 
When we accept some proposition, we adopt it as a policy for guiding our actions or 
inferences, regardless of whether we also believe, and are thus inclined to feel, that the 
proposition is true. Cohen acknowledges that accepting p typically results in believing p in 
the long run, as Pascal hoped would be the case when he urges us to provisionally accept 
Catholic doctrine as a practical policy so that genuine belief may eventually take its place (p. 
18). But this need not happen – one might continue to accept a proposition as a basis for 
further investigation without ever coming to believe or disbelieve it.  
Arcesilaus: Socratic Skepticism in Plato’s Academy 
 203 
In the early dialogues, Socrates clearly proceeds on the assumption that 
virtue is knowledge. In fact, he also supposes that if S knows p, then S cannot 
be refuted regarding p. This enables him to test those who claim to have the 
sort of knowledge he seeks – if they are unable to consistently defend their 
view he concludes that they don’t know what they think they know. In this 
respect the claim that virtue is a kind of knowledge serves as an action-guiding 
principle even while it is itself put to the dialectical test in a number of ways.  
For example, in the Laches, Nicias proposes a view that he has often heard 
from Socrates, namely that courage is knowledge of what is fearful and hopeful 
(194d-195a). Socrates refutes this account by arguing that whatever enables 
one to have knowledge regarding future things enables one to have knowledge 
of the relevant past and present states as well. So Nicias has inadvertently 
identified the knowledge of all goods and evils, not just future ones, and thus 
has offered an account of the whole of virtue and not just a part. At the end of 
this exchange they agree that they have failed to discover what courage is 
(199e). Presumably we should suspend judgment with regard to Nicias’ 
account. But this clearly does not dampen Socrates’ enthusiasm for 
investigating the notion that virtue is, or rather might be, a kind of knowledge. 
In the Meno we find an explicit instance of the attitude in question. 
Socrates agrees to examine the claim that virtue is teachable by means of 
hypothesizing that virtue is knowledge. If we suppose it is knowledge, it will 
immediately follow that it is teachable. But then we must obviously consider 
whether virtue is knowledge (87d). Socrates argues that if we suppose virtue is 
necessarily beneficial and that our actions are only beneficial when they are 
in accordance with knowledge, then virtue must be a kind of knowledge 
(88a-d, cf. Ap., 38a, Crito, 48c-d, Euthyd., 280b-281b). But he then 
immediately calls this conclusion into question by arguing that if virtue is 
knowledge, and thus teachable, there must be teachers of virtue; and yet he 
has never been able to find one (89d-e). Again, it seems the lesson is to 
suspend judgment regarding whether virtue is knowledge, even while 
continuing to act in accordance with this hypothesis by cross-examining 
those who claim to have the knowledge Socrates seeks.  
One final example: in the Republic we find Socrates examining the 
notion that virtue is knowledge of all goods and evils when he introduces 
the form of the good. We are referred again to a view that his interlocutors 
have often heard, namely that it is by their relation to the form of the good 
that anything is useful or beneficial (505a). But when pressed for details, 
Socrates insists that it is not right to talk about things one doesn’t know as 
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if he knew them because opinion without knowledge is shameful (506c). 
Not being up to providing an account of the good itself, he offers the Sun 
Simile, which we may see as a sort of hypothesis or heuristic: suppose the 
form of the good is like the sun so that we may discern the unfamiliar 
features of the former in terms of the familiar features of the latter (508a-
509c). Plato seems to be asking us to entertain the notion as a resource for 
explaining evaluative matters in general. And if there were such a thing, it 
would certainly provide the metaphysical basis for wisdom to be a kind of 
irrefutable knowledge. But is there such a thing? The arguments against the 
theory of the forms in the Parmenides, not to mention the critiques of that 
other famous Academic, Aristotle, may well give us pause on this score. 
Nevertheless, we can readily imagine Socrates suspending judgment with 
regard to whether there is a form of the good, even while continuing to 
propose its existence as the basis for further investigation as a way of trying 
to understand whether or how virtue could be a kind of knowledge.17  
In general, when one suspends judgment regarding whether p, he may 
nonetheless continue to accept that p as a basis for further investigation. If 
I were to suspend judgment regarding whether virtue is sufficient for 
happiness I will neither believe nor disbelieve it and yet may remain 
interested in whether it is the case. This does not conflict with my 
provisional acceptance of the claim since that acceptance does not amount 
to belief. I will not be inclined to feel that it is true even while proposing it 
as a possible truth for the sake of further investigation. In this way, epoche 
and provisional acceptance actually work together with the latter securing 
my ongoing interest in examining the claim about which I have so far 
refused to take a definite stand.  
3. Arcesilaus’ Epistemic Principles 
In this section I aim to show that we should understand the propositions 
featured in the argument I started with as provisional or hypothetical 
                                                                          
17 The proper understanding of the method of hypothesis that Plato describes in the 
Phaedo and its relation to the dialectic described in the Republic, and elsewhere is 
controversial. It is sufficient for my purposes to note that Plato’s dialogues provide ample 
resources for reflecting on cognitive attitudes other than assent or belief, and for supposing 
that Socrates himself adopts such an attitude as a basis for further investigations. See M. 
Byrd, “Dialectic and Plato’s Method of Hypothesis”, Apeiron, 40 (2), 2007, p. 141-158.  
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principles that Arcesilaus derives from his reading of Plato’s dialogues and 
his own dialectical experience.  
(i) It is Rash and Shameful to Assent to Something False or Unknown 
According to Cicero, Arcesilaus considered it rash to approve something 
false or unknown (Varro, 45). The disjunction ‘false or unknown’ is 
ambiguous. Is the shame simply in being wrong – assenting to something 
false – or is it in being incapable of defending one’s views – assenting to 
something unknown? Cicero’s immediate gloss suggests the latter: “… 
because nothing is more shameful than for assent to outstrip knowledge or 
apprehension” (Varro, 45). Since shame is essentially a public 
phenomenon, in order for an act to be shameful it must be possible for it to 
be observed by others. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that the shame lies in 
the failure to adequately defend the views one openly affirms in a dialectical 
exchange as if he knew them to be true (cf. Div., I, 7, ND, I, 1, Lucull., 66-
68). Understood this way, there is a clear precedent in Plato’s Socrates who 
claims that it is the most shameful ignorance to believe that one knows what 
he does not know. For example, many people fear death, shamefully 
supposing that they know it to be the greatest evil, while in fact it may be the 
greatest blessing (Ap., 29a, cf. Charm., 166c-d).  
If we also suppose that whatever the wise person does is virtuous and 
what he refuses to do is rash and shameful, then we may infer a corollary to 
(i), namely that the wise person has no mere opinions. That is, he refuses to 
assent to anything he does not know to be true. And since he will never do 
anything shameful, he will never publicly affirm and defend a view that he 
cannot adequately justify. Insofar as we should all strive to be virtuous, it 
follows that we too should never affirm and defend views that we cannot 
adequately justify.  
When we come to Arcesilaus’ agreement with Zeno regarding (i), 
however, we must provide some important qualifications. Contrary to what 
I have claimed about its Socratic provenance, Cicero says that Zeno was the 
first to formulate the view that the wise person will have no mere opinions 
and that this seemed both true and honorable to Arcesilaus (Lucull., 77; 66). 
Cicero appears to be simply mistaken about Zeno’s originality with regard to 
(i) unless he is referring to the whole package of Stoic epistemology and 
ethics, of which (i) is an integral part. This makes the best sense of the 
dialectical context and it draws attention to the different ways in which 
Zeno and Arcesilaus understand and make use of (i). Directly after 
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registering their agreement, Cicero reports that Arcesilaus challenged Zeno 
to explain what the sage would do if he were unable to grasp anything with 
certainty (Lucull., 77). Arcesilaus appears to be arguing from (i) in the 
following manner: “let us suppose for the sake of argument that the wise 
person holds no opinions and that it is shameful to assent to what is 
unknown. What if he is unable to apprehend anything?” The obvious 
consequence is the same as in the argument I started with, only in this case it 
is the sage who will never give his assent.  
Such a consequence is unacceptable for Zeno however, since on his view 
assent is a necessary precursor of rational, intentional action. To be incapable 
of such action is far too high of a price to pay for the infallibility of the sage. In 
order to provide something worthy of the sage’s assent, Zeno invokes the 
central concept of his epistemology, the kataleptic impression. To qualify as 
kataleptic, an impression must originate from a real object or state of affairs, 
accurately preserve or represent the relevant features of its object or state of 
affairs, and it must be of such a kind as could not arise from what is not (Cic., 
Varro, 42, Lucull., 77; Sext. Emp., M, VII, 151-152; 248-252; see also the 
articles by J.-B. Gourinat and F. Alesse in this special issue). By assenting 
exclusively to such impressions, the wise person will never err, for everything 
he assents to he will know to be true. Arcesilaus countered by arguing that no 
impression could satisfy all three requirements – for any candidate, we can 
imagine circumstances in which that impression is false and yet 
indistinguishable to us from a true one, either because we are mad, dreaming, 
or incapable of discerning the individuating features of the object (Cic., 
Lucull., 88-90; 85-87; Sext. Emp., M, VII, 403-408). The ensuing controversy 
regarding the Stoic account of kataleptic impressions, and accordingly the very 
possibility of attaining Stoic wisdom, occupied Academics and Stoics right up 
to the time of Cicero (Lucull., 78).18 
                                                                          
18 And it continues to be debated today. For some relatively recent discussions, all of 
which contain further references to earlier, important discussions of these issues, as well as 
some relevant literature in contemporary epistemology, see S. Shogry, “Creating a Mind Fit 
for Truth: The Role of Expertise in the Stoic Account of the Kataleptic Impression”, Ancient 
Philosophy [forthcoming], T. Nawar, “The Stoic Account of Apprehension”, Philosophers’ 
Imprint, 14 (29), 2014, p. 1-21, C. Brittain, “The Compulsion of Stoic Assent”, in M. K. Lee 
(ed.), Strategies of Argument: Essays in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology, and Logic, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 332-355, H. Thorsrud, “Arcesilaus and Carneades”, in R. 
Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p. 62-66, C. Perin, “Stoic Epistemology and the Limits of 
Externalism”, Ancient Philosophy, 25, 2005, p. 383-401, Id., “Academic Arguments for the 
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The crucial point here is that in initiating this challenge Arcesilaus 
reveals his willingness to submit a core Socratic principle to dialectical 
scrutiny. Its seeming true and honorable to him may be understood either 
as an overstatement on Cicero’s part or a dialectical ploy to draw out 
Zeno’s defense. In either case, Arcesilaus will suspend judgment with 
regard to the Stoic view that it is shameful to assent to what is unknown on 
the grounds that it violates our rational duty to assent only to kataleptic 
impressions. And he may continue to provisionally accept the notion that 
the sage has no mere opinions as a basis for further investigation into the 
nature of knowledge and virtue; for there are likely to be other ways to 
elaborate and defend (i). As a basis for further investigation, we may think 
of (i) not as a proposition, but as a question: is it ever not shameful to give 
one’s assent? Or as a challenge: explain the conditions in which it would 
not be shameful to assent. 
Treating this principle as a hypothesis also allows us to avoid the self-
referential problem. Since Arcesilaus does not claim to know (i), it would be 
shameful for him to assent to it. But this does not preclude him from 
provisionally accepting (i). Note that a version of this problem remains for the 
Stoics: if Zeno does not claim to be a sage himself, he cannot claim to know (i), 
since only the sage has knowledge in the strict sense; consequently it would be 
shameful for him to assent to (i), or to encourage others to do the same.  
(ii) Nothing Can Be Known 
According to Cicero, Arcesilaus did not wish to merely criticize or refute his 
rival Zeno about the possibility of attaining certainty; he was motivated by a 
desire to discover the truth (Lucull., 77). This desire led him, just as it had 
Socrates, along with Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles and virtually all the 
earlier philosophers, to the recognition of the obscurity of things and a 
confession of ignorance, since opinion and custom prevail over the things we 
wish to understand, our senses our limited, our minds weak, and our lives brief 
(Varro, 44).  
The claim that nothing can be known (akatalepsia) may be understood as 
a form of metaphysical indeterminism – there is no truth to be known – or as 
the epistemological claim suggested by our various limitations, that no 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Indiscernibility Thesis”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86 (4), 2005, p. 493-517, B. Reed, 
“The Stoics’ Account of the Cognitive Impression”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 
23, 2002, p. 147-180. 
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justification can be conclusive. In either case, we should resist reading it as the 
negatively dogmatic assertion that knowledge is in fact impossible; for it is 
more likely part of Arcesilaus’ dialectical strategy. For example, when the 
Stoics complain that if the Academics succeed in undermining the criterion of 
truth they make everything so uncertain that our rational faculties are useless 
(Lucull., 31-32), Arcesilaus deflects the objection: if our faculties are useless for 
discerning the truth, we should blame nature for having concealed it in the 
abyss, as Democritus says (Lucull., 32). This suggests, as Brittain and Palmer 
argue, that Arcesilaus is countering the Stoics’ rational optimism with the 
pessimism of their illustrious predecessors, i.e. he is articulating equally 
powerful arguments for an opposing view to encourage us to withhold assent 
from either side.19 If so, he is not personally endorsing the view that nothing 
can be known, but rather drawing attention to persistent disagreements 
among authoritative and highly regarded philosophers regarding the 
possibility of knowledge.  
However Arcesilaus does not seem to be engaged in this dialectical 
strategy when he adopts (arripuit) from Plato’s dialogues the idea that neither 
the senses nor the mind enable us to grasp anything with certainty (Cic., De 
or., III, 67).20 What Arcesilaus picked out is not a specific argument against the 
possibility of knowledge, but rather a general inconclusiveness insofar as Plato 
never seems to affirm anything as certain but instead offers many arguments 
on either side of issues that seem to be perpetually under investigation (Varro, 
46, cf. Lucull., 74).21 In other words, Arcesilaus is reflecting on Socrates’ 
dialectical experience in the early dialogues, as well as the contested attempts at 
metaphysical system building in the later dialogues. The variety of inconclusive 
attempts to articulate informative definitions of the virtues and to construct a 
metaphysical foundation for the knowledge Socrates sought would be grist for 
the skeptic’s mill. Reflecting on the dialogues this way suggests an enumerative 
                                                                          
19 C. Brittain-J. Palmer, “The New Academy’s Appeals to the Presocratics”, Phronesis, 
46 (1), 2001, p. 38-72. 
20 For less sanguine views about the prospects of deriving skepticism from Plato’s 
dialogues, see D. Sedley, “The Theaetetus: Three Interpretations”, in C. Gill-M. McCabe 
(eds.), Form and Argument in Late Plato, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 86-89, J. Annas, 
“Plato the Skeptic,” in P. Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1994, p. 308-340, C. Shields, “Socrates among the Skeptics”, in Vander 
Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement, p. 341-366. And for a defense of the compatibility of 
Socratic elenchus with skeptical epoche, see P. Woodruff, “The Skeptical Side of Plato’s 
Method”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 40 (156/157), 1986, p. 22-37.  
21 Cooper, “Arcesilaus”, p. 90-92.  
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induction: so far, no one’s definition and none of the proposed metaphysical 
systems have been adequately defended; so, the next attempt will probably fail 
as well; and therefore, probably nothing can be known (specifically with regard 
to the knowledge Socrates sought).  
Taking this last move as an inference however is problematic insofar it 
would then be meant to justify the claim that nothing can be adequately 
justified. A more attractive alternative is to suppose that by ‘adopting’ this view 
from the dialogues, Arcesilaus is provisionally accepting it, since if it were true, 
it would account for the accumulated evidence. But once again this provisional 
acceptance is part and parcel of his suspending judgment – he will neither 
believe nor disbelieve that nothing can be known while he continues to 
investigate whether that is the case. For there are bound to be ways to elaborate 
and defend the possibility of knowledge that he has not yet considered.  
Accordingly, as with (i), we may think of (ii) as a question: can anything be 
known? Or as a challenge for those who claim to know something worthwhile: 
provide your reasons and defend them against objections and counterarguments. 
Read this way, this claim would not be a doctrine to be articulated and defended, 
but rather a hypothesis derived from his interpretation of Socrates’ experience as 
well as the many inconclusive efforts of his Academic predecessors and Stoic 
contemporaries to show how it would be possible to acquire the knowledge 
necessary to flourish.  
And again, as with (i), treating (ii) as a hypothesis similarly allows us to avoid 
the self-referential problem: if one assents to the proposition (ii) that nothing can 
be known, he will either claim to know (ii) or not to know (ii). The former option 
appears to be self-refuting. And while there are ways one might reasonably avoid 
this – e.g. by exempting the claim that I know (ii) from the scope of (ii) – Cicero 
tells us that Arcesilaus did not claim to know even that nothing can be known 
(Varro, 45). But if the only alternative is that Arcesilaus merely believes this 
without knowing it, then he is guilty of committing a shameful act in accordance 
with (i). The attitude of provisional acceptance allows us to say in what sense (ii) 
belongs to Arcesilaus without requiring his assent. 
(iii) We Should Suspend Judgment about Everything (but not in the Way the 
Pyrrhonists Do)  
Sextus claims that Arcesilaus’ practice (agoge) is nearly the same as the 
Pyrrhonist’s: they both suspend judgment about everything, never making 
positive assertions about reality, and never preferring one thing to another as 
being more convincing (PH, I, 232). For both Sextus and Arcesilaus, epoche is 
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the psychological outcome of confronting equipollent arguments. But unlike the 
Pyrrhonist who is led to suspend judgment simply by removing the 
psychological inclination to assent, Arcesilaus is also guided by his provisional 
epistemic principles.22 While accepting (i) does not amount to making an 
assertion about reality, it does involve taking a positive attitude towards a 
principle that, if true, has normative force for everyone. In other words, when 
Arcesilaus provisionally accepts (i) he is not merely acquiescing in the way things 
appear, as the Pyrrhonist does (PH, I, 13-15; 230) – he is proposing to act and 
reason on the basis of a proposition that if true, is true for everyone.  
Sextus, by contrast, expresses a deep mistrust of rational inference since 
reason is capable of undermining even what is apparent (PH, I, 20), and once we 
suspect that reason may be unreliable it is unacceptable to appeal to that very 
instrument to correct itself.23 So the Pyrrhonist would not be willing to even 
provisionally accept such principles as bases for further investigation. 
Appearances are sufficient for the Pyrrhonist, and they simply move us in 
whatever ways they do; they require neither assent nor acceptance.  
Accordingly, Arcesilaus and anyone else who accepts (i) will suspend 
judgment as to whether p so long as the arguments for and against p are equally 
forceful, and thus as long as he does not know whether p. In this sense, 
suspending judgment is the outcome of each individual investigation and does 
not presuppose or rely on (ii). It requires instead the Socratic notion that in 
order to know p, we must be able to adequately defend it. But if the arguments 
for and against are equally forceful, it has not been adequately defended. In that 
case, we should not suppose that we know p, and in keeping with (i) we should 
not assent to p. 
Insofar as we expect the future to resemble the past, however, the 
cumulative effect of these dialectical failures would be a de facto commitment to 
(ii) and the adoption of (iii) as a settled policy. After a lifetime of failing to arrive 
at the truth, how could it be reasonable to expect that the next inquiry will have 
                                                                          
22 This characterization of Sextus’ Pyrrhonism is itself controversial. For a vigorous 
defense of the view that the Pyrrhonist must also be guided by normative epistemic 
principles in his search for truth as well as in his suspension of judgment, see C. Perin, The 
Demands of Reason, An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2010.  
23 This would be an instance of the skeptic’s reciprocal mode – see PH, I, 61; 169, and 
for further discussion: H. Thorsrud, “Sextus Empiricus on the Siren Song of Reason and the 
Skeptical Defense of Ordinary Life”, Logos and Episteme [forthcoming]. 
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a different outcome? Why, in other words, does Arcesilaus persevere in 
searching for the truth?24  
To answer this question we need to appeal once again to Arcesilaus’ 
Socratic inspiration. Ultimately what motivates his provisional acceptance of (i) 
and (ii) is his admiration for Socrates’ lifelong devotion to the pursuit of truth 
and his uncompromising willingness to follow reason where it leads. If we 
suppose, along with Socrates, that virtue is a kind of knowledge that is necessary 
if not also sufficient for eudaimonia, we should allow nothing but the arguments 
to direct our assent or withholding of assent. Following reason in this way is our 
only hope for acquiring the knowledge that we need to flourish. And suspending 
judgment will be the only appropriate, principled response to inconclusive 
investigations – this explains why Arcesilaus thought that suspending judgment 
was in fact good (PH, I, 233).25 
4. Arcesilaus’ Practical Criterion 
The Socratic context also enables us to explain why Arcesilaus was compelled to 
investigate the conduct of life and what role his practical criterion may have 
played in his philosophy. Sextus claims that Arcesilaus offered the reasonable (to 
eulogon) as the criterion according to which one may achieve the telos of human 
life, which he identifies as happiness (M, VII, 158, discussed further below).26 
This raises some difficult questions: how are we to understand this criterion and 
what relation does it have to Arcesilaus’ philosophical practice? Also, given the 
relatively modest nature of ‘the reasonable’ in comparison to the extraordinarily 
high standards set for knowledge and virtue, how can we possibly see the 
resulting life as flourishing and happy? 
To begin we must note the dialectical context in which Arcesilaus offers his 
practical criterion. His opponents attempted to draw unacceptable 
consequences from the principles that (ii) nothing can be known and that (iii) 
we should suspend judgment about everything. If these were true, or even if we 
                                                                          
24 Cicero confirms the tenacity of the New Academics who refuse to abandon their 
enthusiasm for investigation despite the difficulties and well-grounded doubts about their 
ability to discover the truth (Lucull., 7, cf. also Lucull., 65).  
25 Cooper, “Arcesilaus”, p. 95-102. 
26 So Sextus seems to be mistaken in claiming elsewhere that epoche is the goal of 
Arcesilaus’ philosophical practice (PH, I, 232). In fact, for Arcesilaus, we should think of 
epoche more in terms of the unwelcome aporiai in which Socrates and his interlocutors find 
themselves than as a step along the way to the desired state of tranquility that it is for the 
Pyrrhonists – see Ioppolo, “Arcesilaus”, p. 43.  
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believed them, the result would be apraxia, i.e. an inability to successfully engage 
in certain kinds of action.27 These range from purposeful, voluntary action on 
one hand to rational and morally good action on the other. By deriving these 
absurd or unacceptable consequences, the Academics’ opponents attempt to 
establish that their skepticism is either false or pernicious.28  
For example, according to Plutarch, the Stoics objected to Arcesilaus by 
arguing that one who withholds assent would be left with no impulse towards or 
away from anything and thus be frozen in inaction. According to the Stoics, the 
fact that something appears good to me has no motivating force by itself, except 
in a dispositional sense. So it is only when we assent to such impressions that 
voluntary action occurs. Arcesilaus responds, apparently in terms of the Stoics’ 
own theory:  
The soul has three movements – impression, impulse and assent. The movement of 
impression we could not remove, even if we wanted to; rather, as soon as we encounter 
things, we get an impression and are affected by them. The movement of impulse, when 
aroused by that of impression, moves a person actively towards appropriate objects […] So 
those who suspend judgment about everything do not remove this movement either, but 
make use of the impulse which leads them naturally towards what appears appropriate. 
What, then, is the only thing they avoid? That only in which falsehood and deception are 
engendered – opining and precipitately assenting, which is yielding to the appearance out of 
weakness and involves nothing useful. For action requires two things: an impression of 
something appropriate and an impulse towards the appropriate object that has appeared; 
neither of these is in conflict with suspension of judgment (Plutarch., Adv. Col., 1122C-D = 
LS 69A).29 
Non-rational animals do seem to engage in voluntary action without assent – 
i.e., without affirming as true the propositional content of some impression. But 
the possibility of remaining active in the manner of non-rational animals should 
                                                                          
27 G. Striker, “Sceptical Strategies”, in Ead., Essay on Hellenistic Epistemology and 
Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 92-115.  
28 For a detailed taxonomy and illuminating discussion of the varieties of the apraxia 
objection levelled at both Academic and Pyrrhonian skeptics, see K. Vogt, “Scepticism and 
Action”, in Bett (ed.), Ancient Scepticism, p. 165-180. Obdrzalek adds considerably to our 
understanding of these objections, as presented in Cicero’s Academica, by dividing them 
further into an evidential form (which aims to show the skeptical claims are false by deriving 
absurd, impossible consequences) and a pragmatic form (which aims to show that assenting 
to the skeptical claims is inadvisable by drawing out possible but pernicious consequences): 
S. Obdrzalek, “From Scepticism to Paralysis: The Apraxia Argument in Cicero’s 
Academica”, Ancient Philosophy, 32, 2012, p. 369-392. 
29 A. A. Long-D. N. Sedley [= LS], The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1987, I, p. 450. 
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have been as unappealing to the Socratic Arcesilaus as to the Stoics. For such 
non-rational action can never be virtuous for those who have supposed that 
virtue is a kind of knowledge.  
It is more plausible to suppose that Arcesilaus offered this theory in the 
spirit of his ongoing effort to argue against whatever anyone is willing to defend. 
The purely dialectical nature of this argument is further suggested by both the 
reliance on Stoic concepts and by the intrusion of akatalepsia when he claims 
that those who suspend judgment avoid the falsehood and deception that arises 
from precipitately assenting. In other words, insofar as Zeno and the Stoics fail 
to show how the wise person could assent only to kataleptic impressions, they 
must embrace the conclusion that the only way their sage can preserve his 
infallibility is by suspending judgment (Lucull., 66-67). The notion that this sage 
may still engage in non-rational action should not therefore be seen as a 
consolation but as further dialectical opposition to the tenability of the Stoic 
account of knowledge and wisdom.  
Arcesilaus is responding to a different version of apraxia when Sextus 
attributes the criterion of the reasonable to him. In this version, the skeptic’s 
rejection of the Stoic criterion of truth is supposed to make virtue and happiness 
impossible.  
But since after this [viz. Arcesilaus’ argument against the kataleptic impression as a criterion 
of truth] it was necessary to investigate the conduct of life, too, which is not of a nature to be 
explained without a criterion, on which happiness too, i.e. the end of life, has its trust 
dependent, Arcesilaus says that one who suspends judgment about everything will regulate 
choice and avoidance and actions in general by ‘the reasonable’ [to eulogon]; and that by 
proceeding in accordance with this criterion he will act rightly; for happiness is acquired 
through prudence, and prudence resides in right actions, and right action is whatever, once 
it has been done, has a reasonable justification; therefore one who attends to the reasonable 
will act rightly and be happy (Sext. Emp., M, VII, 158 = LS 69B).30 
Once again Arcesilaus seems to be employing the Stoics’ technical terms, so we 
might think that a purely dialectical interpretation is also in order, one which 
draws unwelcome consequences for the Stoic by proposing a deflated, second-
best view of right action and happiness.31 In this case, however, the resulting 
                                                                          
30 Ibid., p. 450-451. 
31 See Striker, “Sceptical Strategies”, p. 101-103. Ioppolo convincingly argues to the 
contrary that neither Arcesilaus’ promotion of epoche nor his practical criterion can be 
reduced to dialectical theses (Ioppolo, “Arcesilaus”, p. 44-46). Snyder claims that Arcesilaus 
is aiming at a more positive outcome by assisting the Stoics in a cooperative, Socratic spirit to 
produce a more adequate and coherent view: C. Snyder, “The Socratic Benevolence of 
Arcesilaus’ Dialectic”, Ancient Philosophy, 43 (2), 2014, p. 341-363. 
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theory does not conflict with his Socratic project but rather reaffirms it. 
Following Socrates, the idea motivating Arcesilaus’ investigations, is that in 
order to act virtuously and achieve happiness, we must know that our choices are 
good. So to attempt to act virtuously and achieve happiness we must attempt to 
provide reasonable justifications of the goodness of our choices. This only 
requires that we import the notion of reasonable justification to the Socratic 
requirement on knowledge: in order for S to know p, S cannot be refuted 
regarding p, which requires (at a minimum) a reasonable justification of p.  
Dialectically there is another intrusion of akatalepsia in Arcesilaus’ 
proposal. For what prompts his introduction of the reasonable as a criterion is 
precisely the gap left by the refutation of the Stoic account of apprehension. 
Note that Sextus says the conduct of life is not to be explained or accounted for 
without a criterion. The Pyrrhonist acts strictly in accordance with how things 
appear and is neither interested nor willing to offer an explanation for the 
goodness or appropriateness of his choices. The Academic, engaged in the 
Socratic project of examining his life, owes us an account of himself, one that is 
aimed at establishing the actual goodness of his choices. Since the Academic 
must still live his life, and decide what to pursue and what to avoid while he is 
searching for truth, he must be willing to articulate the grounds on which he 
makes these judgments. But rather than doing so in the spirit of metaphysical 
system-building, he may propose some account that, if true, would show that his 
actions were virtuous and his life happy. In this sense, providing reasonable 
justifications is a way of generating further hypotheses for the sake of examining 
our lives and continuing the Socratic project.32 
Is it, for example, reasonable to avoid politics and be unconcerned with 
money as Arcesilaus was? It should be unacceptable for a Socratic to merely 
observe that these seem good or reasonable and to act on that basis. These are 
momentous decisions that require thorough and detailed defense. And so, we 
may suppose that any candidate for reasonable justification would ultimately 
need to rely on some account of the way the world is and our relation to it, i.e. 
the very sort of philosophical theory that Plato and his doctrinaire successors 
develop in various ways in their written works.  
                                                                          
32 Schofield anticipates this view when he suggest that Arcesilaus may have thought 
following the reasonable is like entertaining a hypothesis about some theoretical matter, 
which requires only a working assumption rather than an assent or judgment regarding the 
truth: M. Schofield, “Academic Epistemology”, in Algra-Barnes-Mansfeld-Schofield (eds.), 
The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 334.  
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But what could count as reasonable in the absence of apprehension? I have 
already argued that it cannot be simply whatever happens to appear reasonable 
at the moment.33 But on the other extreme, it clearly cannot be the standard of 
perfect rationality that characterizes the positive affective states of the sage 
(eupatheiai), for these reasonable (eulogon) attractions or avoidances require 
apprehension of the relevant evaluative truths (Diog. Laert., VP, VII, 115). Is it 
then something less demanding?  
If Arcesilaus had been proposing his practical criterion as a doctrine it 
would be fair to demand a definition of to eulogon and examples of successful 
justifications. But as a proposal, any account whatsoever may be advanced and 
examined as a candidate. If so, the very question of what constitutes the 
reasonableness of a reasonable justification will be remain open to debate. In the 
same way, what constitutes knowledge remains an open question for Arcesilaus, 
even as he is motivated by his provisional acceptance that virtue is a kind of 
knowledge that is necessary, if not sufficient, for happiness.  
5. Carneades’ Practical Criterion 
Arcesilaus’ great successor Carneades took over as head of Plato’s Academy 
sometime before 155 BCE.34 He also refrained from writing (DL 1.16, 4.65), 
devoting himself instead to the Socratic project of seeking the truth by means of 
                                                                          
33 For defense of the notion that the reasonable is whatever happens to appear so at 
the moment, akin to the Pyrrhonist’s undogmatic adherence to the customs of ordinary 
life: T. Brennan, “Reasonable Impressions in Stoicism”, Phronesis, 41 (3), 1996, p. 318, 
333-334, Hankinson, Sceptics, p. 89-91. Ioppolo roots to eulogon in nature by drawing on 
Plutarch’s report to supplement Sextus’ account: impulse naturally leads us to what is 
appropriate, which in turn makes it possible to provide a reasonable justification for the 
resulting action (Ioppolo, “Arcesilaus”, p. 45-46). However, in assimilating Arcesilaus’ 
reliance on to eulogon to the Pyrrhonists’ reliance on nature, I believe she undermines the 
credibility of his Socratic allegiance to following reason. For summary and critique of 
Ioppolo’s more detailed presentation of this view in Opinione e scienza, see J. Annas, “The 
Heirs of Socrates”, Phronesis, 33 (1), 1988, p. 100-112. 
34 The most frequently repeated anecdote regarding Carneades is that the Athenians 
sent him, along with two other philosophers, as ambassadors to Rome in 155 B.C., where he 
supposedly scandalized the Romans by arguing for and then against a certain conception of 
justice on subsequent days (Cic., De rep., III, 9). However, Powell has shown that this report 
is probably Cicero’s fabrication, largely on the grounds that such a display would have 
undermined Carneades’ diplomatic charge to seek a reduction in a fine levelled against the 
Athenians: J. Powell, “The Embassy of the Three Philosophers to Rome in 155 BC”, in C. 
Kremmydas-K. Tempest (eds.), Hellenistic Oratory: Continuity and Change, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013, p. 219-248. 
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argument pro and contra (Varro, 46, Lucull., 16; ND, I, 4; I, 11-12; Tusc., V, 11; 
Eus., PE, XIV, 7, 15).35 Like Arcesilaus, he is closely associated with the ideas 
that it is shameful to assent to what is not known, that nothing can be known 
(for there is no criterion of truth), and that we should suspend judgment. So in 
order to understand Carneades we face the same interpretative challenge, 
namely to articulate the epistemic principles that inform his practice and to 
explain the cognitive attitude he takes towards those principles.36  
In one sense, Carneades’ practice is more ambitious than Arcesilaus’. 
Rather than arguing against whatever an individual was willing to actually 
defend, Carneades produced systematic taxonomies of ethical and 
epistemological positions in an effort to argue against not merely the views that 
were actually held, but the views that could be held, given certain constraints.37 
Thus, Sextus remarks that Carneades targeted all of his dogmatic predecessors in 
arguing that nothing is without qualification a criterion of truth (M, VII, 159-
165). 
However, like Arcesilaus, Carneades was confronted with apraxia 
objections, and responded with a distinctive criterion for the conduct of life and 
for the achievement of happiness, the persuasive (to pithanon). Insofar as we have 
failed to discover a criterion that invariably picks out the truth, we must rely on 
one that tells the truth for the most part, the persuasive or convincing 
impression (he pithane phantasia, M, VII, 166-189, PH, I, 226-230, Lucull., 98-
110). It is controversial as to whether Carneades endorsed this criterion himself 
and relied on it both for the conduct of life and for philosophical investigation, 
                                                                          
35 Fragments and testimonia for Carneades are collected in H. J. Mette, “Weitere 
Akademiker heute: Von Lakydes bis zu Kleitomachos”, Lustrum, 27, 1985, p. 39-148.  
36 For two recent attempts, see H. Thorsrud, “Carneades”, in D. Machuca-B. Reed 
(eds.), Skepticism from Antiquity to the Present, London, Bloomsbury, 2018, p. 51-66, and J. 
Dillon, “Carneades the Socratic”, Dionysus, 34, 2016, p. 27-45. 
37 On Carneades’s epistemological arguments, see M. Frede, “Stoics and Sceptics on 
Clear and Distinct impressions”, in Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 170-175, J. Allen, “Carneadean Argument in Cicero’s Academic 
Books”, in B. Inwood-J. Mansfeld (eds.), Assent and Argument. Studies in Cicero’s Academic 
Books, Leiden-New York-Köln, Brill, 1997, Schofield, “Academic Epistemology”, p. 338-
344. On his ethical arguments, see K. Algra, “Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero: The Ethical 
divisiones in Cicero’s Lucullus”, in Inwood-Mansfeld (eds.), Assent and Argument, p. 120-
138, J. Annas, “Carneades’ Classification of Ethical Theories”, in A. M. Ioppolo-D. N. 
Sedley (eds.), Pyrrhonists, Patricians, Platonizers: Hellenistic Philosophy in the Period 155-86 
BC, Tenth Symposium Hellenisticum, Naples, Bibliopolis, 2007, p. 187-224. 
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as Cicero suggests (Lucull., 32).38 In any case, Carneades’ skeptical practice and 
practical criterion inspired the eventual development of fallibilism in the 
Academy.39 Depending on how the historical narrative is constructed, this 
development may be seen either as a degeneration or as a culmination of the 
originally uncompromising skeptical and Socratic spirit of Arcesilaus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
38 Brittain accounts for such passages as a later intrusion of mitigated skepticism into 
Carneades’ real position of universal epoche and exclusively dialectical engagement with 
dogmatists: C. Brittain, Philo of Larissa, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 95-96, 
103-108. For a critical review of this position, see J. Glucker, “The Philonian/Metrodorians: 
Problems of Method in Ancient Philosophy”, Elenchos, 25, 1994, p. 99-152. See also, S. 
Obdrzalek, “Living in Doubt: Carneades’ Pithanon Reconsidered”, Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy, 31, 2006, p. 243-80 and H. Thorsrud, “Radical and Mitigated 
Skepticism in Cicero’s Academica”, in W. Nicgorski (ed.), Cicero’s Practical Philosophy, 
Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2012, p. 133-151. 
39 For later developments in the skeptical Academy: H. Tarrant, Scepticism or 
Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1985, Brittain, Philo, p. 73-168, R. J. Hankinson, “Natural Criteria and the Transparency of 
Judgment: Antiochus, Philo and Galen on Epistemological Justification”, in Inwood-
Mansfeld (eds.), Assent and Argument, p. 161-216, G. Striker, “Academics Fighting 
Academics”, in Inwood-Mansfeld (eds.), Assent and Argument, p. 257-276, C. Lévy, “The 
Sceptical Academy: Decline and Afterlife”, in Bett (ed.), Ancient Scepticism, p. 81-104.  
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